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ABSTRACT 
Mobile phones and other handheld devices incorporating cellular capabilities, 
such as Personal Digital Assistants, are ubiquitous.  Besides placing calls, these 
devices allow users to perform other useful tasks, including text messaging and 
phonebook entry management.  When cell phones and cellular devices are 
involved in a crime or other incident, forensic specialists require tools that 
allow the proper retrieval and speedy examination of data present on the 
device.  For devices conforming to the Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) standards, certain data such as dialed numbers, text 
messages, and phonebook entries are maintained on a Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM).  This paper gives a snapshot of the state of the art of forensic 
software tools for SIMs and an explanation of the types of digital evidence they 
can recover.1 
Keywords: Mobile Phone, Forensic Tool, Subscriber Identity Module 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standards for cellular 
networks, originally developed by the European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations, were continued by the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute and are now maintained by the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).  Commercial GSM service was started 
in mid-1991.  By 1993, thirty-six GSM networks were operating in twenty-two 
countries (Dechaux and Scheller 1993).  Although begun in Europe, GSM is an 
international standard with compliant networks operational in more than 200 
countries around the world (GSM World 2006).   
Subscriber Identity Modules (SIMs) are synonymous with mobile phones and 
devices that interoperate with GSM cellular networks.  Under the GSM 
framework, a cellular phone is referred to as a Mobile Station and is partitioned 
into two distinct components: the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and the 
Mobile Equipment (ME).  As the name implies, a SIM is a removable 
                                                 
1 Certain commercial products and trade names are identified in this paper to illustrate technical 
concepts.  However, it does not imply a recommendation or an endorsement by NIST 
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component that contains essential information about the subscriber.  The ME, 
the remaining radio handset portion, cannot function fully without one.  The 
SIM’s main function entails authenticating the user of the cell phone to the 
network to gain access to subscribed services.  The SIM also provides a store 
for personal information, such as phone book entries and text messages, as well 
as service-related information.   
GSM standards are organized in a number of ways, one of them being the 
phase of capabilities they support.  The three phases defined are phase 1, phase 
2, and phase 2+, which correspond roughly to first, second, and 2.5 generation 
network facilities.  SIMs are often classified according to the phase of the 
specifications supported, which is recorded in an element of its file system 
(i.e., EFPhase).  Another class of SIMs in early deployment is UMTS SIMs 
(USIMS) used in third generation (3G) UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications Service) networks.  USIMs are enhanced versions of 
present-day SIMs, containing backward compatible information. 
Some of the earliest, general purpose, forensic tools for mobile phones targeted 
SIMs, not only because of detailed specifications available for them, but also 
because of the highly relevant and useful digital evidence that could be 
recovered.  This paper provides a review of present-day forensic tools for SIMs 
and the type of data they recover, plus an assessment of their capabilities and 
limitations. 
2. SIM CHARACTERISTICS 
The SIM-ME partitioning of a cell phone stipulated in the GSM standards has 
brought about a form of portability.  Moving a SIM between compatible cell 
phones automatically transfers with it the subscriber’s identity and the 
associated information and capabilities.  In contrast, present-day CDMA 
phones do not employ a SIM.  Analogous SIM functionality is instead directly 
incorporated within the device.  While SIMs are most widely used in GSM 
systems, comparable modules are also used in iDEN (Integrated Digital 
Enhanced Network) phones and UMTS user equipment (i.e., a USIM).  
Because of the flexibility a SIM offers GSM phone users to port their identity, 
personal information, and service between devices, eventually all cellular 
phones are expected to include (U)SIM-like capability.  For example, 
requirements for a Removable User Identity Module (R-UIM), as an extension 
of SIM capabilities, have been specified for cellular environments conforming 
to TIA/EIA/IS-95-A and -B specifications, which include Wideband Spread 
Spectrum based CDMA (3GPP2 2001). 
At its core, a SIM is a special type of smart card that typically contains a 
processor and between 16 to 128 KB of persistent electronically erasable, 
programmable read only memory (EEPROM).  It also includes random access 
memory (RAM) for program execution, and read only memory (ROM) for the 
operating system, user authentication and data encryption algorithms, and other 
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applications.  The SIM’s hierarchically organized file system resides in 
persistent memory and stores such things as names and phone number entries, 
text messages, and network service settings.  Depending on the phone used, 
some information on the SIM may coexist in the memory of the phone.  
Alternatively, information may reside entirely in the memory of the phone 
instead of available memory on the SIM.   
Though two sizes of SIMs have been standardized, only the smaller size shown 
in Figure 1 is broadly used in GSM phones today.  The module has a width of 
25 mm, a height of 15 mm, and a thickness of .76 mm, which is roughly the 
footprint of a postage stamp.  Though similar in dimension to a MiniSD or an 
MMCmobile removable memory card supported by some cell phones, SIMs 
follow a different set of specifications with vastly different characteristics.  For 
example, their 8-pin connectors are not aligned along a bottom edge as with 
removable media cards, but instead form a circular contact pad integral to the 
smart card chip, which is embedded in a plastic frame.  Also, the slot for the 
SIM card is normally not accessible from the exterior of the phone to facilitate 
frequent insertion and removal as with a memory card, and instead, typically 
found in the battery compartment under the battery.   
 
Figure 1: SIM Format 
When a SIM is inserted into a phone handset and pin contact is made, a serial 
interface is used for communicating between them.  A SIM can be removed 
from a phone and read using a specialized SIM card reader and software 
through the same interface.  Standard-size smart card adapters are also 
available for SIMs, which allows them to be inserted into and read with a 
conventional smart card reader.   
2.1 File System Organization 
As shown in Figure 2, the file system of a SIM is organized in a hierarchical 
tree structure, composed of the following three types of elements (3GPP 
2005a): 
• Master File (MF) - the root of the file system that contains dedicated 
and elementary files. 
• Dedicated File (DF) - a subordinate directory to the master file that 
contains dedicated and elementary files. 
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• Elementary File (EF) - a file that contains various types of formatted 
data, structures as either a sequence of data bytes, a sequence of fixed 
size records, or a fixed set of fixed size records used cyclically. 
The GSM standards define several important dedicated files immediately under 
the MF: DFGSM, DFDCS1800, and DFTELECOM.  For the MF and these DFs, 
several EFs are defined, including many that are mandatory.  The EFs under 
DFGSM and DFDCS1800 contain mainly network related information respectively 
for GSM 900 MHz and DCS (Digital Cellular System) 1800 MHz band 
operation.  EFs for U.S. 850 MHz and 1900 MHz bands are found respectively 
under those DFs as well, and typically contain identical information.  The EFs 
under DFTELECOM contain service related information.  The contents of specific 
EFs are discussed later in the paper. 
 
Figure 2: SIM File System 
Though SIM file systems are highly standardized, the standards allow 
flexibility such that their content can vary among network operators and 
service providers.  For example, a network operator might not use an optional 
file system element, might create an additional element on the SIM for use in 
its operations, or might install a built-in function to provide a specialized 
service.   
2.2 Security 
Smart cards, including SIMs, employ a range of tamper resistance techniques 
to protect the information they contain.  In addition, various levels of rights 
exist that are assigned to a DF or EF, to control the conditions of access (3GPP 
2005a): 
• Always - Access can be performed without any restriction. 
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• Card Holder Verification 1 (CHV1) - Access can be performed only 
after a successful verification of the user’s PIN, or if PIN verification 
is disabled. 
• Card Holder Verification 2 (CHV2) - Access can be performed only 
after a successful verification of the user’s PIN2, or if PIN2 
verification is disabled. 
• Administrative - Access can be performed only after prescribed 
requirements for administrative access are fulfilled. 
• Never - Access of the file over the SIM/ME interface is forbidden.   
The SIM operating system controls access to an element of the file system 
based on its access condition of and the type of action being attempted (3GPP 
2005a).  For example, actions on EFs include searching, reading, and updating 
the contents.  While reading and searching the contents of a particular EF 
might be allowed without CHV1 verification (i.e., an Always access 
condition), updating might likely require CHV1 being correctly verified as a 
prerequisite (i.e., a CHV1 access condition).  In general, CHV1 protects core 
SIM data selectively against unauthorized reading and updating, while CHV2 
protects mainly optional data.  Both CHVs contain 4-8 digits and can be 
modified or disabled by the user.  
The SIM operating system allows only a preset number of attempts, usually a 
limit of three, to enter the correct CHV before further attempts are blocked.  
Submitting the correct Unblock CHV value, also known as a PUK (PIN 
Unblocking Key), resets the CHV and the attempt counter.  If the identifier of 
the SIM (i.e., its Integrated Circuit Chip Identifier or ICCID) is known, the 
Unblock CHV for either CHV1 or CHV2 can be obtained from the service 
provider or the network operator.  The ICCID is normally imprinted on the 
SIM along with the name of the network provider.  If needed, the identifier can 
also be read with a SIM tool from an EF, EFICCID, since the Always access 
condition applies by definition.  If the number of attempts to enter an Unblock 
CHV value correctly exceeds a set limit, normally ten attempts, the card 
becomes blocked permanently.   
Authenticating a device to a network securely is a vital function performed via 
the SIM.  Cryptographic key information and algorithms within the tamper 
resistant module provide the means for the device to participate in a challenge-
response dialogue with the network and respond correctly, without exposing 
key material and other information that could be used to clone the SIM and 
gain access to a subscriber’s services.  Cryptographic key information in the 
SIM also supports stream cipher encryption to protect against eavesdropping 
on the air interface (Vedder 1993, Willassen 2003). 
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3. DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
Various types of digital evidence can be recovered from a SIM.  Evidence can 
be found scattered throughout the file system in various EFs located under the 
MF, as well as under the aforementioned DFs.  Several general categories of 
evidence can be identified: 
• Service-related Information 
• Phonebook and Call Information 
• Messaging Information  
• Location Information.   
The remainder of this section reviews EFs commonly used by forensic 
specialists, which fall under each category (Dearsley 2005, Willassen 2003).  
The standardized EF names and abbreviations found in the 3GPP TS 11.11 
Technical Specification (3GPP, 2005a), though sometimes unusual, are used 
throughout this discussion for consistency.  
3.1 Service-related Information 
The Integrated Circuit Card Identification (ICCID) is a unique numeric 
identifier for the SIM that can be up to 20 digits long.  It consists of an industry 
identifier prefix (89 for telecommunications), followed by a country code, an 
issuer identifier number, and an individual account identification number (ITU-
T, 2006).  Aside from the prefix, the components of an ICCID are variable, 
making them sometimes difficult to interpret.  The ICCID can be read from the 
SIM without providing a PIN and can never be updated.  The country code and 
issuer identifier can be used to determine the network operator providing 
service and obtain call data records for the subscriber. 
The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a unique 15-digit 
numeric identifier assigned to the subscriber.  It has a somewhat similar 
structure to the ICCID: a Mobile Country Code (MCC), a Mobile Network 
Code (MNC), and a Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (MSIN) assigned by 
the network operator.  The MCC is 3 digits, while the MNC may be either 2 or 
3 digits, with the MSIN taking up the remainder.  The forth byte of another EF, 
Administrative Data (AD), gives the length of the MNC (3GPP 2006).  
Networks use IMSIs to identify which network a device owner subscribes and, 
if not their network, whether to allow those network subscribers to access 
service.   
The ICCID and IMSI can be used reliably to identify the subscriber and the 
network operator providing service.  Since these identifiers can be 
misinterpreted, however, other SIM data can help confirm a finding. 
The Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN) is 
intended to convey the telephone number assigned to the subscriber for 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(2) 
 
81 
receiving calls on the phone.  Unlike the ICCID and IMSI, however, the 
MSISDN is an optional EF.  If present, its value can be updated by the 
subscriber, making it a less reliable data source, since it would then be 
inconsistent with the actual number assigned.   
The Service Provider Name (SPN) is an optional EF that contains the name of 
the service provider.  If present, it can be updated only by the administrator 
(i.e., Administrator access).  Similarly, the Service Dialling Numbers (SDN) 
EF contains numbers of special services such as customer care and, if present, 
can help identify to which network the SIM is registered. 
3.2 Phonebook and Call Information 
The Abbreviated Dialling Numbers (ADN) EF retains a list of names and 
phone numbers entered by the subscriber.  The storage allows commonly 
dialed phone numbers to be selected by name and updated or called using a 
menu or special buttons on the phone, providing rudimentary phonebook 
operation.  Most SIMs provide around 100 slots for ADN entries.   
The Last Numbers Dialled (LND) EF contains a list of the most recent phone 
numbers called by the device.  A name may also be associated with an entry 
and stored with a number (e.g., a called phonebook entry).  Though a number 
appears on the list, a connection may not have been successful, only attempted.  
Most SIMs provide only a limited number of slots (e.g., ten) for these entries.  
Some phones do not store called numbers on the SIM and instead rely on their 
own memory for storage.   
3.3 Messaging Information 
Text messaging is a means of communication in which messages entered on 
one cell phone are sent to another via the mobile phone network.  The Short 
Message Service (SMS) EF contains text and associated parameters for 
messages received from or sent to the network, or are to be sent out as an MS-
originated message.  SMS entries contain other information besides the text 
itself, such as the time an incoming message was sent, as recorded by the 
mobile phone network, the sender's phone number, the SMS Center address, 
and the status of the entry.  The status of a message entry can be marked as free 
space or as occupied by one of the following: a received message to be read, a 
received message that has been read, an outgoing message to be sent, or an 
outgoing message that has been sent.  Messages deleted via the phone interface 
are often simply marked as free space and retained on the SIM until they are 
overwritten.  When a new message is written to an available slot, the unused 
portion is filled with padding, overwriting any remnants of a previous message 
that might be there. 
The capacity for stored messages varies among SIMs.  Many cell phones also 
use their own internal memory for storing text messages.  The choice of 
memory where messages are stored (i.e., SIM or phone) can vary depending on 
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the phone software and user settings (Willassen 2005).  For example, a default 
arrangement might be for all incoming messages to be stored on the memory of 
the SIM before using internal phone memory, while outgoing messages are 
stored only if explicitly requested.  Phone models of a particular generation and 
manufacturer often behave consistently in this respect (Willassen 2005). 
The maximum length of a single SMS message entry is 160 characters of text.  
Messages exceeding that length must be broken down into smaller segments by 
the sending phone and reassembled by the receiving phone.  This feature is 
especially useful for foreign languages character sets such as Chinese or Arabic 
whose encoding consumes more than twice the number of bits per character 
than with English.  A reference number parameter identifies the entries whose 
segments require reassembly.  Such messages are referred to as concatenated 
messages.  SMS messages may originate through other means than a cell 
phone, such as from an Internet SMS server or through electronic mail.   
An SMS message can be coded in different ways.  The original and most 
common encoding scheme is a GSM-specific 7-bit character set packed into a 
bit stream (3GPP 1999).  Such an encoding cannot be readily interpreted 
directly from the raw data using a hex editor, nor supports all languages.  
Support for other character sets, such as 16-bit Unicode, was added for 
languages whose alphabet cannot be represented using the original Western 
European character set (3GPP 2005b).  
An Enhanced Messaging Service (EMS) was defined as a way to extend SMS 
message content to allow simple multimedia messages to be conveyed.  EMS 
messages can contain not only formatted text with different font styles and 
fonts, but also black and white bitmap pictures and monophonic melodies 
(3GPP 2005b).  EMS message content resides in the SMS EF along with SMS 
message content.  EMS messaging is essentially an application-level content 
extension to SMS, which conforms to the general SMS message structure and 
support for concatenated messages.  EMS-enabled devices are backward 
compatible by definition with SMS-enabled devices.   
3.4 Location Information 
A GSM network consists of distinct radio cells used to establish 
communications with mobile phones.  Cells are grouped together into defined 
areas used to manage communications.  Phones keep track of the area under 
which they fall for both voice and data communications.  The Location 
Information (LOCI) EF contains the Location Area Information (LAI) for 
voice communications.  The LAI is composed of the MCC and MNC of the 
location area and the Location Area Code (LAC), an identifier for a collection 
of cells.  When the phone is turned off, the LAI is retained, making it possible 
to determine the general locale where the phone was last operating.  Because a 
location area can contain hundreds or more cells, the locale can be quite broad.  
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However, it can nevertheless be useful in narrowing down the region where the 
event occurred.   
Similarly, the GPRS Location Information (LOCIGPRS) EF contains the 
Routing Area Information (RAI) for data communications over the General 
Packet Radio Service (GPRS).  The RAI is composed of the MCC and MNC of 
the routing area and the LAC, as well as a Routing Area Code (RAC), an 
identifier of the routing area within the LAC.  Routing areas may be defined 
the same as location areas or they may involve fewer cells, providing greater 
resolution.   
4. FORENSICS TOOLS 
The main objective of a forensic SIM tool is to extract digital evidence present 
in the file system.  Besides acquisition, most forensic SIM tools support a 
range of examination and reporting functions.  Some tools deal exclusively 
with SIMs, while others are part of a complete toolkit that also addresses 
handsets.   
The most important characteristic of a forensic tool is its ability to maintain the 
integrity of the original data source being acquired and also that of the 
extracted data.  The former is done by blocking or otherwise eliminating write 
requests to the device containing the data.  The latter is done by calculating a 
cryptographic hash of the contents of the evidence files created and recurrently 
verifying that this value remains unchanged throughout the lifetime of those 
files.  Preserving integrity not only maintains credibility from a legal 
perspective, it also allows any subsequent investigation use the same baseline 
for replicating the analysis.   
A number of products are available for managing user data on a SIM.  They 
allow certain data to be read onto a personal computer, updated, and rewritten 
back to the SIM.  Tools such as these are questionable, since they are not 
designed specifically for forensic purposes.  Given the number of forensic tools 
available, SIM management tools should be avoided.   
The SIM must be removed from the phone and inserted into an appropriate 
reader for acquisition.  Unlike forensic acquisition of a hard drive, capturing a 
direct image of the data is not a sensible option because of the protection 
mechanisms built into the SIM.  Instead, command directives called 
Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs) are sent to the SIM to extract data, 
without modification, from relevant EFs in the file system (Casadei 2005).  
The APDU protocol is a simple command-response exchange.  Each element 
of the file system defined in the standard has a unique numeric identifier 
assigned, which can be used to reference the element and perform some 
operation, such as reading the contents in the case of an acquisition tool (3GPP 
2005a).  
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Forensic SIM tools require either a specialized reader that accepts a SIM 
directly or a general-purpose reader for a full-size smart card.  For the latter, a 
standard-size smart card adapter is needed to house the SIM for use with the 
reader.  Table 1 lists several SIM forensic tools and which of the primary 
functions of acquisition, examination, and reporting are supported.  The first 
four listed, Cell Seizure, GSM .XRY, Mobiledit!, and TULP2G, also handle 
phone memory acquisition.  Note that some SIM data, but not all, can be 
recovered via the handset using such tools.  However, some forensic issues 
may arise when acquiring SIM data via the phone.  The most common one is 
that the status of an “unread” message can be changed to “read.” 
Table 1: SIM Tools 
Tool Function 
Cell Seizure Acquisition, Examination, Reporting2 
GSM .XRY Acquisition, Examination, Reporting3 
Mobiledit! Forensic Acquisition, Examination, Reporting4 
TULP 2G Acquisition, Reporting5 
Forensic Card Reader Acquisition, Reporting6 
ForensicSIM Acquisition, Examination, Reporting7 
SIMCon Acquisition, Examination, Reporting8 
SIMIS Acquisition, Examination, Reporting9 
 
4.1 Evidence Recovery 
While all of the stored SIM data may potentially have evidentiary value, a 
good deal of the data is network service related and has little direct evidentiary 
value.  Generally, SIM forensic tools do not recover every possible item on a 
SIM.  The breadth of coverage also varies considerably among tools.  Table 2 
entries give an overview of those items recovered, listed at the left, by the 
various SIM forensic tools, listed across the top. 
 
                                                 
2 Version 2.0.0.33660, see www.paraben-forensics.com 
3 Version 2.5, see www.msab.com/en 
4 Version 1.95, see www.mobiledit.com 
5 Version 1.1.0.2, see tulp2g.sourceforge.net 
6 Version 1.0.1, see www.becker-partner.de/forensic/intro_e.htm 
7 Version 1.3.0.0, see www.radio-tactics.com/forensic_sim.htm 
8 Version 1.1, see www.simcon.no 
9 Version 2.0.13, see www.crownhillmobile.com 
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Table 2: Content Recovery Coverage 
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IMSI X X X X X X X X 
ICCID X X X X X X X X 
MSISDN X X  X X X X X 
SDN X   X  X X X 
SPN X   X  X X X 
Phase X X X   X X X 
ADN X X X X X X X X 
LND X X X X X X X X 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
LOCI X X  X X X X X 
GPRSLOCI X     X X X 
 
4.2 Decoding and Translation 
Forensic tools can present acquired data to the user in several ways, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.  Each step, however, can introduce errors.  The most 
basic form is the raw encoded data received in response to an APDU request.  
As mentioned earlier, text encoded in the packed 7-bit GSM alphabet is 
onerous and time consuming to decode manually.  Another less onerous 
decoding involved binary coded decimal (BCD) numeric identifiers.  Most, but 
not all, tools decode raw data into a usable form for interpretation by the user, 
wherever possible. 
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Figure 3: Data Decoding and Translation 
Several tools go beyond decoding and attempt to translate the decoded data 
into a form more meaningful to the user, using some database.  Translation is 
particularly the case with numeric data.  For example, the BCD-encoded value 
of the MCC and MNC portion of the LAI, “130014,“ decodes to “310410,” 
where 310 is the MCC value and 410 is the MNC value.  The country code 310 
is assigned to the United States, while the network code 410 is assigned to 
Cingular.   
5. TOOL ASSESSMENT 
SIMs are highly standardized devices whose interface, behavior, and content 
are relatively uniform.  All of the SIM tools broadly support any SIM for 
acquisition via an external reader.  Scenarios were used to populated SIM data 
to gauge the capabilities of the forensic tool to acquire information.  The 
emphasis in the scenarios is on loading the SIM with specific kinds of 
information for recovery.  Once a scenario is performed using a suitable GSM 
phone or SIM management program, the tool can logically acquire the SIM.   
The scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive or to serve as a formal product 
evaluation.  However, they attempt to cover a range of data commonly 
encountered when examining a SIM and are useful in determining the 
capabilities afforded an examiner.  Table 3 gives an overview of the SIM 
scenarios.  Note that none of the scenarios attempt to confirm whether the 
integrity of the data on a SIM is preserved when applying a tool – that topic 
was outside the scope of the effort.   
Table 3: SIM Scenarios 
Scenario Description 
Basic Data Determine whether the tool can recover core subscriber 
(i.e., IMSI, ICCID, and SPN elementary files), 
phonebook (i.e., ADN elementary file), call (i.e., LND 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(2) 
 
87 
Scenario Description 
elementary file), and SMS message information on the 
SIM, including deleted SMS entries, and whether all of 
the data is properly decoded and displayed.   
Location Data Determine whether the tool can recover location-
related information (i.e., LOCI and LOCIGPRS 
elementary files), on the SIM, and whether all of the 
data is properly decoded and displayed.   
EMS Data Determine whether the tool can recover EMS messages 
over 160 characters in length and containing non-
textual content, and whether all of the data is properly 
decoded and displayed for both active and deleted 
messages.   
Foreign Language 
Data 
Determine whether the tool can recover SMS messages 
and phonebook data from the SIM that are in a foreign 
language, and whether all of the data is properly 
decoded and displayed.   
 
The scenario results for each tool are weighed against the predefined 
expectations and assigned a ranking.  The entry “Meet” indicates that the 
software met the expectations of the scenario for the device in question.  Since 
the scenarios are acquisition oriented, this ranking generally means that all of 
the identified data was successfully recovered.  Similarly, the entry “Below” 
indicates that the software fell short of fully meeting expectations.   
A “Below” ranking is often a consequence of a tool performing a logical 
acquisition and being unable to recover deleted data, which is understandable.  
However, the ranking may also be due to active data on the device not being 
successfully recovered, which is more of a concern.  A good example of this is 
SMS messages that have been deleted, but not overwritten by another message.  
The entry “Miss” indicates that the software unsuccessfully met any 
expectations, highlighting an area for improvement.   
Table 4 gives a summary of the results for each tool used with several test 
SIMs: the 5343 from T-Mobile, the 8778 from Cingular, and the 1144 from 
AT&T.  Note that very few misses were experienced.  The main ones were due 
to difficulties that Cell Seizure and Forensic SIM had in successfully acquiring 
any data from the Cingular SIM.  The remaining ones were due to the limited 
breadth of coverage Mobiledit! has for SIM data, as noted earlier in Table 2.   
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Table 4: Tool Result Summary 
SIM 
Tool Scenario 
5343 8778 1144 
Basic Data Meet Miss Meet 
Location Data Meet Miss Meet 
EMS Data Below Miss Below 
Cell Seizure 
Foreign Language Data Below Miss Below 
Basic Data Meet Meet Meet 
Location Data Below Below Below 
EMS Data Meet Meet Meet 
GSM .XRY 
Foreign Language Data Below Below Below 
Basic Data Below Below Below 
Location Data Miss Miss Miss 
EMS Data Below Below Below 
Mobiledit! 
Forensic 
Foreign Language Data Below Below Below 
Basic Data Meet Meet Meet 
Location Data Below Below Below 
EMS Data Meet Meet Below 
TULP 2G 
Foreign Language Data Meet Meet Meet 
Basic Data Below Below Below 
Location Data Below Below Below 
EMS Data Below Below Below 
Forensic Card 
Reader 
Foreign Language Data Below Below Below 
Basic Data Meet Miss Below 
Location Data Meet Miss Below 
EMS Data Below Miss Below 
ForensicSIM 
Foreign Language Data Below Miss Below 
Basic Data Meet Below Below 
Location Data Meet Meet Meet 
EMS Data Meet Meet Meet 
SIMCon 
Foreign Language Data Meet Meet Meet 
Basic Data Meet Meet Meet 
Location Data Meet Below Below 
EMS Data Below Below Below 
SIMIS 
Foreign Language Data Below Below Below 
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The remainder of this section discusses areas where the forensic tools fell 
below expectations and gives some specific examples.  A more comprehensive 
discussion is available elsewhere (Ayers, R. et al. 2005). 
5.1 Basic Data 
Generally, recovering Basic Data posed little problems for most tools, with the 
exception of deleted SMS data.  Certain tools did not recover some useful data, 
as noted in Table 2.  A more serious concern was that a couple of the tools 
failed to acquire the SIM at all.  One tool failed to display the full name of a 
maximum size phonebook entry and another truncated all names by one 
character.  In both cases, other output provided by tools could be used to view 
the missing characters.  One tool consistently prepended the IMSI with a parity 
quartet. 
An interesting problem occurred in translating the IMSI values of the SIMs.  
Several European tools failed to translate the IMSI correctly, ignoring the AD 
value that contains the size of the MNC portion to use when decoding the value 
to a network name, and instead defaulting to 2-digits.  Because North 
American MNCs are 3-digit in size, a translation error occurred.  However, 
because the decoded data used for translation was also provided, one could 
manually perform a correct translation.   
5.2 Location Data 
As noted in Table 2, several tools recovered LOCI, but not LOCIGPRS data.  
One tool recovered neither.  One of the tools that recovered data failed to 
report the MCC/MNC portions of the LAI, while another incorrectly presented 
a LOCI component value.  
The MNC portion of the LAI, a three-digit value, was incorrectly decoded by 
one tool.  A couple of the tools did not attempt to translate the LAI and RAI 
codes into a network name and avoided the problem.  One of them did not even 
attempt to decode the raw data to simplify manual translation. 
5.3 EMS Data 
Recovery of EMS text messages greater that 160 characters posed little 
problems for most tools, except for two tools that had problems recovering 
deleted EMS messages, the same ones noted in Table 2 for deleted SMS 
messages.  EMS messages bearing images were a different story.  Two sizes of 
images were embedded with text: small 16x16 pixel and large 32x32 pixel 
images.  The results are shown in Table 5. 
Only two of the tools, GSM .XRY and SIMCon successfully acquired and 
displayed both size of embedded images.  The only other tool to acquire an 
image successfully, TULP 2G, did so only for the small image.  For the large 
image, it failed to report the presence of the message, missing it entirely.  Two 
of the other tools successfully recovered the text, but misinterpreted the image 
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value, while another tool recovered the text and provided a notification that 
image data was present. 
Table 5: Picture Messages with Text 
 Text & Small Image Text & Large Image 
Cell Seizure 
Unsuccessful Acquisition – 
Cingular SIM lßìOß&/Ψà 
GSM XRY 
  
Mobiledit! Picture msg Emspictur 
TULP 2G  Missed Entirely 
SIMIS 
@@@@@@@x?P¡K? 
 00@@@@@@@@Picture 
msg  
?@@@ @@ 耀@??@@?
@(@$@?@?@??4p@@D
ฆ ?(Xq?x7  
@q,?@p巀@ba?@@D? 
@??P?@x였@?@p尀@??@$
?????8x솀@S mspict
ur 
Forensic SIM 
Unsuccessful Acquisition – 
Cingular SIM 
Header – Large Picture 
User Data – Emspictur 
Forensic CR 
#"èY@@@@@@@@@x£Pò 
BaK?ààààlÆ??00@@@@@
@@@Picture msg 
¥!èL@@p£@@@ß@@@?è
@@@££@@ò 
@@¡@ò@@è@$@¿@¿@üàà
ààààààààà?4p@@DàøÆ¡(Xq¥
x7? 
@q,¥@på7@@baù@¿Él@@
D¥ 
@¡?P£@xì?@@à@¥@på0@
@ü£ù@¿É¿@$ö¥ø¿¡?¡£8xìÆ
@@àààààààààSàààà?Emspict
u 
SIMCon 
  
 
5.4 Foreign Language Data 
Foreign language data occurred in both the ADN phonebook and SMS message 
entries.  Both French and Asian characters were used.  Table 6 illustrates the 
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results for SMS messages.  Only one tool failed to display French language 
messages correctly.  However, using a dump feature, the correct data could be 
found.  For Asian messages, only one tool, SIMCon, correctly displayed the 
message.  Most of the others came close, but appended spurious characters.  
The remainder garbled the message contents, though the date/time stamp and 
other header information were presented correctly. 
The results for French and Asian ADN entries generally followed those for 
SMS messages.  However, one of the tools performed worse for French ADN 
entries than for SMS message entries, while another performed worse for 
Asian ADN entries than for SMS message entries. 
Table 6: Foreign Language Messages 
 French Asian 
Cell Seizure Il est entété mais sincère Headers OK, Message Garbled 
GSM XRY 
Il est entété mais sincère 
阿婆家里面对于是否则的
确实现在家里面对于—
阿婆 
Mobiledit! 
Il est entété mais sincère 
阿婆家里面对于是否则的
确实现在家里面对于˥敐
签 
TULP 2G Il est entété mais sincère 
阿婆家里面对于是否则的
确实现在家里面对于—?? 
SIMIS 
Il est ent鴩 mais sinc貥 阿婆家里面对于是否则的确实现在家里面对于— 
Forensic SIM Il est entété mais sincère Headers OK, Message Garbled 
Forensic CR Il est entété mais sincère Headers OK, Message Garbled 
SIMCon Il est entété mais sincère 
阿婆家里面对于是否则的
确实现在家里面对于 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Forensic examination of cellular devices is a growing subject area in computer 
forensics.  Forensic examination tools translate data to a format and structure 
that is understandable by the examiner and can be effectively used to identify 
and recover evidence.  However, tools may contain some degree of 
inaccuracies.  For example, the tool’s implementation may contain a 
programming error; a specification used by the tool to translate encoded bits 
into data comprehensible by the examiner may be inaccurate or out of date; or 
the protocol used to access the SIM may be incorrect, causing the tool to 
function improperly in certain situations.   
Over time, experience with a tool provides an understanding of its limitations, 
allowing an examiner to compensate where possible for any shortcomings or to 
turn to other means of recovery.  Practice in mock examinations can help gain 
an in-depth understanding of a tool's capabilities and limitations, which often 
involve subtle distinctions, and also provide the opportunity to customize 
facilities of the tool for later use. 
Forensic software tools for SIMs are in the mid-stages of maturity.  While the 
tools discussed in this paper generally performed well and had adequate 
functionality, new versions are expected to improve and better meet 
investigative requirements.  For instance, during the course of preparing this 
paper, a new version for nearly every tool was issued, which included 
functionality enhancements and occasionally some deficiencies.  Because 
variability can occur between versions of tools, quality measures should be 
applied to ensure that results remain consistent and any variations understood. 
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